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USE OF MILITARY FORCE AT HOME
Jason Mazzone*
Under what circumstances can military force be used domesti-
cally? Does the President get to decide?  Is there a role for Con-
gress?  Can Congress limit the President’s domestic use of the
military or would that be an impermissible interference with the
powers of the commander in chief?
There might be good reasons to use military force at home to
prevent or respond to terrorism and other incidents.  Detonation
of a nuclear device, for example, or an attack involving a biological
weapon, would cause destruction and chaos on a scale that would
make use of the military almost essential.1 How about in lesser cir-
cumstances: can the military be used for more ordinary counterter-
rorism, emergency-response, or law-enforcement purposes?
I will have something to say in a moment about the statutory
scheme—including an old statute, the Posse Comitatus Act, and
the law Congress put in place in October 2006—but let us begin
with the Constitution.
As we have already heard today, the current administration
reads the commander in chief provision of the Constitution2 very
broadly to include a whole range of powers that belong exclusively
to the President, fenced off from congressional supervision or in-
terference.  With respect to domestic deployment of the military,
we have more in the Constitution to work with in figuring out the
appropriate roles of Congress and of the executive branch.
In that spirit, begin with what the Constitution actually says
about the President being commander in chief.  According to Arti-
cle II, section 2: “The President shall be Commander in Chief of
the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the
several States, when called into the actual Service of the United
States.”3
* Associate Professor of Law at Brooklyn Law School.  He is the author of The
Security Constitution and is at work on several other projects examining governmental
powers in times of emergency.
1 For example, a crude nuclear weapon detonated in midtown Manhattan during
the day would kill 200,000 people, destroy buildings in a five-mile radius, and render
much of New York City “uninhabitable for decades.” IRWIN REDLENER, AMERICANS AT
RISK: WHY WE ARE NOT PREPARED FOR MEGADISASTERS AND WHAT WE CAN DO NOW 70
(2006).
2 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
3 Id.
369
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The reason I am giving you all of this is that it links up with
some other important parts of the Constitution in ways that allow
us to say something more meaningful about the scope of the Presi-
dent’s powers rather than simply infer things from the fact that the
President is made the commander in chief.
So here are the other provisions of the Constitution to keep in
mind: Article I gives Congress powers to “raise and support Ar-
mies,”4 to “provide and maintain a Navy”5 and to “make Rules for
the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces.”6 Ar-
ticle I also authorizes Congress to “provide for calling forth the
Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections
and repel Invasions.”7 Article IV of the Constitution says that the
United States “shall protect each of [the states] against Invasion;
and . . . against domestic Violence.”8 The “shall protect” language
is important: Article IV imposes on the United States an affirmative
protection obligation, a point I shall return to in a moment. The
Constitution also imposes obligations on the President specifically.
A series of presidential obligations are contained in section 3 of
Article II.9 Important for our purposes is the one that says the Pres-
ident “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”10 These
provisions help us address with some precision the constitutional
circumstances for using military force at home.
Let us back up and think for a moment about these provisions
in their historical context.  To the Americans who wrote and rati-
fied the Constitution, security was a large concern.11 A central pur-
pose of the Constitution was to put in place a system to prevent
violence—attacks from external forces, as well as insurrections
from within—and to maintain law and order.12 Everyone under-
4 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
5 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 13.
6 Id. art. I, § 8,  cl. 14.
7 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
8 Id. art. IV, § 4.
9 Id. art. II, § 3.
10 Id.
11 See Jason Mazzone, The Security Constitution, 53 UCLA L. REV. 29, 37–47 (2005)
[hereinafter Mazzone] (discussing fears in the ratifying era of external attacks and
internal violence and the role these concerns played at the Philadelphia Convention
and the state ratifying conventions).
12 When the Philadelphia Convention got underway with Edmund Randolph
enumerating the defects in the Articles of Confederation and presenting the Virginia
Plan, he began with the problem of maintaining security. JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF
DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 29–30 (Adrienne Koch ed., Ohio
Univ. Press, 1984) (1840) (“1. that the confederation produced no security against
foreign invasion. . . . 2. that the federal government could not check quarrels between
states, nor a rebellion in any, not having constitutional power nor means to interpose
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stood that government simply would not work if security were not
maintained.  It was also clear to the ratifying generation that the
national government would have to play an important security
role.13 Left to fend for themselves, the states would not do the job
properly or sufficiently.14 At the same time, Americans in the pe-
riod after the revolutionary war feared giving a strong role to what
they called a standing army: professional soldiers, under the com-
mand of a central government.15 Standing armies had to be
avoided wherever possible because while they might produce secur-
ity it would come at the price of the peoples’ liberties.16
These two concerns—the need for security on the one hand,
the fear of a professional army on the other—explain the provi-
sions of the Constitution I have just identified. The Constitution
assigns a security role to the national government: the national gov-
ernment is required to protect the states. In performing that func-
tion, the national government is allowed to create and make use of
professional military forces. But, recognizing the dangers of this,
the Constitution offers an alternative: federal deployment of the
militia under the control of the commander in chief. The militia
according to the exigency.”); id. at 29 (“The Character of . . . [the new federal] gov-
ernment ought to secure 1. against foreign invasions: 2. against dissentions between
members of the Union, or seditions in particular states.”).
13 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 4, at 21 (John Jay) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (explain-
ing how a strong national government will “apply the resources and power of the
whole to the defence of any particular part”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, at 149 (Alexan-
der Hamilton) (arguing in favor of making the national government “the guardian of
the common safety”); id. (explaining that the national government will “make suitable
provision for the public defence” because it is the “representative of the whole” and
so “will feel itself most deeply interested in the preservation of every part”).
14 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 4, at 21–22 (John Jay). Jay writes:
Leave America divided into thirteen, or if you please into three or four
independent Governments, what armies could they raise and pay, what
fleets could they ever hope to have? If one was attacked would the
other[s] fly to its succour, and spend their blood and money in its de-
fence? Would there be no danger of their being flattered into neutrality
by specious promises, or seduced by a too great fondness for peace to
decline hazarding their tranquility and present safety for the sake of
neighbors, of whom perhaps they have been jealous, and whose impor-
tance they are content to see diminished? Altho’ such conduct would
not be wise it would nevertheless be natural.
15 U.S. v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178–79 (1939) (“The sentiment of the time strongly
disfavored standing armies; the common view was that adequate defense of country
and laws could be secured through the Militia—civilians primarily, soldiers on occa-
sion.”). See generally Bernard Donahoe & Marshall Smelser, The Congressional Power to
Raise Armies: The Constitutional and Ratifying Conventions, 1787–1788, 33 REV. POL. 202
(1971).
16 LAWRENCE DELBERT CRESS, CITIZENS IN ARMS: THE ARMY AND THE MILITIA IN
AMERICAN SOCIETY TO THE WAR OF 1812, at 44 (1982).
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comprised members of the local community, operating, ordinarily,
under local control.17 Making the militia available, for temporary
federal service, was meant to reduce the need for or temptation to
rely on a standing army of professional soldiers.18
Focusing on the militia provisions of the Constitution and un-
derstanding the history of these provisions illuminate the circum-
stances under which military force might properly be used in a
domestic context.  As I have said, Congress is given power to pro-
vide for calling forth the militia for three purposes: to execute fed-
eral laws, suppress insurrections and repel invasions.19 A sensible
interpretation is that the use of the militia in these three circum-
stances requires congressional authorization. Unless Congress has
so provided, the militia cannot be called forth.
How about regular soldiers? Can they be used domestically?
That question is of interest to us because the militia, in its old
form, no longer exists.20 The ratifying history suggests that the
availability of the militia was never intended to preclude the use of
regular forces—only to provide an incentive to use the militia in-
stead.21 In seeking to maintain security, government might not be
able to depend on the militia (militia forces might be the same
local people engaged in an insurrection) and so nothing in the
Constitution says the militia must be used for domestic security.22
Congress, we know, is empowered to create the Army and the
Navy (and presumably the Air Force), and Congress can set rules
17 See generally JERRY COOPER, THE RISE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD: THE EVOLUTION
OF THE AMERICAN MILITIA, 1865–1920 (1997).
18 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 29, at 184–85 (Alexander Hamilton) (stating that the
militia is “the only substitute that can be devised for a standing army; [and] the best
possible security against it, if it should exist”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, at 321 (James
Madison) (arguing that given the option of calling forth the militia, the federal gov-
ernment would never need an army bigger than 30,000 men); Debate before the Con-
vention of the Commonwealth of Virginia (June 14, 1788) (statement of James
Madison), in 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 381 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter 3 EL-
LIOT’S DEBATES] (“The most effectual way to guard against a standing army, is to
render it unnecessary. The most effectual way to render it unnecessary, is to give the
general government full power to call forth the militia.”).
19 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
20 See H. RICHARD UVILLER & WILLIAM G. MERKEL, THE MILITIA AND THE RIGHT TO
ARMS, OR, HOW THE SECOND AMENDMENT FELL SILENT 153–54 (Duke Univ. Press)
(2002) (concluding that neither the National Guard nor any other modern military
force is equivalent to the old militia).
21 See Mazzone, supra note 11, at 64–70 (explaining this incentive scheme).
22 Shays’ Rebellion, on the eve of the Constitutional Convention, amply demon-
strated that militia forces might be unwilling to suppress a local insurrection. See THE
FEDERALIST NO. 28 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing this problem).
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for their internal regulation. However, and in contrast to Congress’
power to provide for the use of the militia, nothing in the Constitu-
tion specifies that Congress must first authorize the domestic de-
ployment of regular forces: the Constitution is simply silent about
whether Congress has any authorizing role with respect to the do-
mestic use of soldiers. Congress might decline to create an army or
a navy or decline to equip and fund the military in ways conducive
to its domestic use.  But once these forces are created, nothing in
the Constitution requires that Congress give authorization for their
domestic use before they can be deployed. That suggests a rather
simple conclusion: the President does not need Congress’ advance
permission to deploy soldiers domestically.
What if Congress prohibits the use of military force in the do-
mestic context? That, I think, is more complicated.23 But go back
to Article IV of the Constitution, which requires that the United
States protect the states from invasions and from domestic vio-
lence. Both the President and the Congress are part of the United
States and so they both bear that obligation. The President also has
an obligation under Article II to execute the laws of the Union.
The President’s obligations, then, correspond to the circumstances
under which Congress is given authority to provide for the use of
the militia: to repel invasions, suppress insurrections, and enforce
the law.  It follows, I think, that if the militia is not available, either
because Congress has not provided for calling it forth, or because
for some other reason it would be unwise or undesirable to depend
upon the militia, the President, in fulfilling his security obligations,
23 Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579 (1952), is the canonical statement that the scope of the President’s au-
thority is a function of Congress’ own actions.  Jackson explained:
When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authoriza-
tion of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that
he possesses in how own right plus all that Congress can delegate. . . .
When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or
denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers,
but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have con-
current authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. . . . When the
President takes measures incompatible with the express or implied will
of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb.
Id. at 635–37 (Jackson, J., concurring).  It is not clear that this approach, developed in
a case involving President Truman’s seizure of private steel mills to protect the ability
of the United States to continue to perform a military role in Korea, can be applied
wholesale to the question of the domestic use of military force to fulfill constitutional
security obligations.  Indeed, with respect to constitutional obligations, a converse
formula might sensibly apply: if the Congress has not itself fulfilled the security obliga-
tions of the United States under Article IV of the Constitution, the President’s respon-
sibility to act to fulfill those obligations is heightened.
374 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:369
is allowed, indeed (because these are obligations) is probably re-
quired, to deploy regular military forces.
This does not mean, however, that the President’s powers are
unlimited or that there is no role for Congress.  The President’s
proper use of military force in the domestic context is limited to
the three stated categories. Using military force at home for any
other purpose is improper.  At this point, one might well ask: does
terrorism fall within any of the three categories for the proper use
of military force? A terrorist attack might be considered an inva-
sion; terrorism might also be deemed a form of domestic violence
(though perhaps that term refers more appropriately to riots or
attempts to overthrow or destabilize government).24 The Constitu-
tion therefore likely does permit the President to use domestically
military forces in cases of terrorism or other kinds of violence.  The
conclusion flows not from some stretched reading of the com-
mander in chief provision but from the other parts of the Constitu-
tion I have told you about.
With respect to the third category of presidential obligations,
executing federal laws, Congress probably has considerable scope
to limit the President’s domestic use of military force. Congress is,
of course, responsible for enacting the federal statutes the Presi-
dent is obligated to execute.  If enforcement of a statute generates
violent opposition, Congress can elect to repeal or revise the stat-
ute, rather than leave it in place for the President to enforce with
military forces.25 At least when it comes to enforcement of statutory
law, Congress can likely limit the President’s use of military
power.26
24 See Mazzone, supra note 11, at 138–39 (discussing how terrorism falls within the
scope of the Protection Clause of Article IV).
25 More difficult questions might arise if, rather than repeal a statute (leaving the
President nothing to enforce), Congress instead places limitations on the means by
which the President is permitted to enforce the statute, for example, by specifying
that the President cannot use military force.  Perhaps a sensible way of recognizing
both the obligations of the President and the interests of Congress in the enforcement
of statutes is to distinguish between wholesale limitations on presidential enforcement
mechanisms and statute-specific limitations. Under this approach, it would be permis-
sible for Congress to specify that the President should not use military force to en-
force an individual statute.  The statute could, therefore, be understood to be in
force, as law, only to the extent it is enforceable by ordinary civil authority.  By con-
trast, Congress should not pass a general law prohibiting use of military force in all
circumstances because this would cut too deeply into the President’s constitutional
obligation.
26 There might be less scope for Congress to interfere if the source of the federal
law the President seeks to enforce is the Constitution rather than a statute.  For exam-
ple, there might be good reason to allow the President, without being constrained by
Congress, to use military force in order to enforce (over violent opposition) a federal
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Moreover, the Constitution probably does not permit the Pres-
ident to use military force to carry out any old law in the first in-
stance.  The evidence from the ratifying conventions indicates that
military force is only appropriate when civil efforts to enforce fed-
eral laws have failed: when the implementation of federal laws is
opposed with violence or when federal interests are otherwise
under attack.27 Under that scenario, hopefully rare, the President
court decree mandating school integration.  On the other hand, Congress’ special
role in enforcing certain constitutional provisions suggests that even here Congress
might limit the President’s manner of enforcement. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5
(“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions
of this article.”); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2 & U.S. CONST. amend. XV § 2.
27 Evidence from the Virginia ratifying convention supports this interpretation.
On June 14, 1788, General Green Clay asked “to be informed why the Congress were
to have power to provide for calling forth the militia, to put the laws of the Union into
execution.” Debate before the Convention of the Commonwealth of Virginia (June
14, 1788), in 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 18, at 378.  Madison’s explanation fo-
cused on the provision as limited to implementing federal laws that have generated
opposition and resistance on the ground—Congress’ power was not a general power
to use the militia to carry out all federal programs but rather was closely tied to sup-
pressing insurrections and repelling invasions.  Madison stated:
If resistance should be made to the execution of the laws . . . it ought to
be overcome. This could be done only in two ways—either by regular
forces or by the people. . . . If insurrections should arise, or invasions
should take place, the people ought unquestionably to be employed, to
suppress and repel them, rather than a standing army. The best way to
do these things was to put the militia on a good and sure footing, and
enable the government to make use of their services when necessary.
Id.  The militia, Madison noted, would only be called forth to execute the laws when
“resistance to the laws required it” because the sheriff’s “posse . . . were insufficient to
overcome the resistance to the execution of the laws.” Id. at 384.  Where, however,
“the civil power was sufficient,” the use of the militia “would never be put in practice.”
Id.
On the other hand, Madison observed that in order to make use of the militia to
execute federal laws, resistance did not have to rise to the level of an invasion or
insurrection: “There are cases in which the execution of the laws may require the
operation of militia, which cannot be said to be an invasion or insurrection. There
may be a resistance to the laws which cannot be termed an insurrection.” Id. at 408.
For example, “a riot d[oes] not come within the legal definition of an insurrection.
There might be riots, to oppose the execution of the laws, which the civil power might
not be sufficient to quell.” Id. at 410.
The point was hammered home in response to Patrick Henry’s concerns. Henry
argued that because it made no provision for Congress to use civil powers to enforce
its laws, the Constitution dangerously allowed for the use of military powers in the first
instance. Id. at 387. George Nicholas offered a rebuttal.  The Constitution, Nicholas
argued, did not say “the civil power shall not be employed,” and therefore it did not
alter the normal governmental practice that “[t]he civil officer is to execute the laws
on all occasions.” Id. at 392.  If, however, the laws were “resisted, this auxiliary power is
given to Congress of calling forth the militia to execute them, when it shall be found
absolutely necessary.” Id.  Edmund Randolph, agreeing with Nicholas’s interpreta-
tion, stressed the need for “common sense [as] the rule of interpreting this Constitu-
tion.” Id. at 400.  Since there was no “exclusion of civil power,” or a suggestion “that
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can send in the militia if it is available or, in the alternative, the
alternative we live with today, send in federal troops.
Let us talk, then, about the relevant statutes.  In 1792, Con-
gress put in place statutory mechanisms for the President to call
forth militiamen for domestic security.28  In addition, the 1807 In-
surrection Act authorized the President to use regulars to respond
to insurrections within states and to ensure the execution of fed-
eral law.29 There are many occasions on which early presidents ac-
ted in accordance with this original statutory scheme.30
In 1878, Congress passed the Posse Comitatus Act, which is
still in place today.31 The Posse Comitatus Act came out of opposi-
tion to federal troops’ activities in the South during Reconstruc-
tion.  The Act says that “except in cases and under circumstances
expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress,” active
military forces cannot be used to “execute the laws” of the United
States.32 There are various exceptions to this rule—including the
President’s use of troops to quell insurrections under the modern
incarnation of the old Insurrection Act.33 Congress could, of
course, repeal the Posse Comitatus Act if it were to interfere with
counterterrorism or other things Congress thought the President
should be free to use the military for.
We have talked a lot today about 9/11 and about the scope of
Congress’ joint resolution on September 18, 2001, the Authoriza-
tion for Use of Military Force.  But the more relevant event for my
purposes is not 9/11, but Hurricane Katrina.  After Katrina, and
the bungled government response, in October 2006, as part of a
military appropriations bill, Congress authorized the President to
deploy military forces to states and localities following a natural
disaster or other emergency.34 The provision, which amends the
old Insurrection Act, is entitled “Use of the Armed Forces in Major
Public Emergencies.” It authorizes the President to deploy troops
the laws are to be enforced by military coercion in all cases,” the proper inference was
that “when the civil power is not sufficient, the militia must be drawn out.” Id.
28 See Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 264 (“An act to provide for calling forth
the Militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel inva-
sions.”); Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 271 (“An Act more effectually to provide
for the National Defence by establishing an Uniform Militia throughout the United
States”).
29 Act of March 3, 1807, ch. 39, 2 Stat. 443.
30 See Mazzone, supra note 11, at 91–137 (collecting examples).
31 20 Stat. 145, ch. 263 (1878) (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2006)).
32 Id.
33 10 U.S.C. §§ 331–34 (2006).
34 See National Defense Authorization Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 109–364, 120 Stat.
2083.
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in order to implement law and order when state government is
unable to maintain control such that federal rights are put in jeop-
ardy or there is opposition to the enforcement of federal laws.35
Does the President require this congressional authority?  Can
the President go further than Congress has said? Following the at-
tacks of September 11, 2001, administration lawyers took the posi-
tion that “the Posse Comitatus Act . . . which generally prohibits
the use of the Armed Forces for law enforcement purposes absent
constitutional or statutory authority to do so, does not forbid the
use of military force for the military purpose of preventing and
deterring terrorism within the United States.”36 One might under-
35 The section reads:
Use of Armed Forces in Major Public Emergencies.—
(1) The President may employ the armed forces, including the National Guard in
Federal service, to—
(A) restore public order and enforce the laws of the United States when, as a result of
a natural disaster, epidemic, or other serious public health emergency, terrorist attack
or incident, or other condition in any State or possession of the United States, the
President determines that—
(i) domestic violence has occurred to such an extent that the constituted authorities
of the State or possession are incapable of maintaining public order; and
(ii) such violence results in a condition described in paragraph (2); or
(B) suppress, in a State, any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination,
or conspiracy if such insurrection, violation, combination, or conspiracy results in a
condition described in paragraph (2).
(2) A condition described in this paragraph is a condition that—
(A) so hinders the execution of the laws of a State or possession, as applicable, and of
the United States within that State or possession, that any part or class of its people is
deprived of a right, privilege, immunity, or protection named in the Constitution and
secured by law, and the constituted authorities of that State or possession are unable,
fail, or refuse to protect that right, privilege, or immunity, or to give that protection;
or
(B) opposes or obstructs the execution of the laws of the United States or impedes
the course of justice under those laws.
(3) In any situation covered by paragraph (1)(B), the State shall be considered to
have denied the equal protection of the laws secured by the Constitution.
(b) Notice to Congress. The President shall notify Congress of the determination to
exercise the authority in subsection (a)(1)(A) as soon as practicable after the deter-
mination and every 14 days thereafter during the duration of the exercise of that
authority.
Pub. L. No. 109–364 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 333).
36 Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department
of Justice, to William J. Hynes II, General Counsel, Department of Defense, Potential
Legal Constraints Applicable to Interrogations of Persons Captured by U.S. Armed
Forces in Afghanistan, n. 16 (citing Memorandum to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to
the President & William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, Department of Defense, from
John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General & Robert J. Delahunty, Special Coun-
sel, Office of Legal Counsel, Authority for the Use of Military Force to Combat Ter-
rorist Activities within the United States 15–20 (Oct. 23, 2001)), reprinted in THE
TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 144, 163 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L.
Dratel, eds. 2005).
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stand this statement to say only that the Posse Comitatus Act, which
deals with law enforcement, does not, as a statutory matter, reach
counterterrorism. One might, though, understand the claim to be
that Congress cannot interfere with the President’s powers to de-
ploy military forces in a domestic context to prevent or respond to
terrorism. On that score, in light of the obligations the Constitu-
tion imposes on the President, if terrorism is an invasion or an in-
surrection, the claim might well be correct.
